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Installment Four: the Heart Sutra Continued
Saturday, 30-Dec-00 11:13:08

       Herewith we continue our discussion of the Heart Sutra. In this installment we conclude the explanation of the
       uncommon prologue. From this portion of the sutra arises a multi-faceted discussion which begins with an historically
       significant development in the evolution of the Mahayana doctrine, and proceeds to discuss the buddhist psychology
       which explains the process by which self is reified. To understand the relevance of this view to our world, we will
       explore the act of perception and the process by which it gives rise to thoughts. Finally, this view is considered with
       regards the mind/matter dilemma in the context of its function and its causes. Integral top these discussions are
       epistemological knowledge and the existential quality of mind and matter. As ever, we begin with the portion of the
       Sutra previously discussed.

THE SUTRA OF THE HEART OF TRANSCENDENT KNOWLEDGE

            Thus have I heard. Once the Blessed One was dwelling in Rajagriha at Vulture Peak mountain, together
            with a great gathering of the sangha of monks and a great gathering of the sangha of bodhisattvas. At
            that time the Blessed One entered the samadhi that expresses the dharma called "profound
            illumination,"

4.0The Uncommon Prologue Continued

and at the same time noble Avalokiteshvara, the bodhisattva mahasattva, while practicing the
profound prajnaparamita, saw in this way: he saw the five skandhas to be empty of nature.

       4.1
       There are three important points to consider in this line. The first is that the Buddha and Avalokiteshvara seem to be
       doing the same practice, the second is implication of the word ‘saw’ and the third is the meaning of the skandhas. The
       first point is that Avalokiteshvara, is practicing the profound prajnaparamita. That is, he’s doing the same practice the
       Buddha is. Does that make him a buddha? According to some commentaries it does i. However, I think it is less
       problematic to say he was able, at the very least, just to maintain shunyata in meditative equipoise. A difference
       between a bodhisattva and a buddha is that a buddha’s enlightenment is unceasing. Shunyata, or the experience of
       emptiness may be glimpsed in meditation, but without training it is unstable and degenerates as the post meditation
       period lengthens. By and by, the shunyata is stabilized and the bodhisattva progresses through the bhumis and attains
       buddhahood. A bodhisattva at the level of the first bhumi ii for example, can maintain shunyata in meditation – but not
       in the post meditation experience. As he/she travels the bhumis, he/she stabilizes and strengthens that mind.
       Avalokiteshvara could have a nonconceptual mind in meditation, therefore, and still not have had complete, final
       enlightenment. What Avalokiteshvara saw in his meditation – until interrupted by Shariputra, was that the five
       skandhas were empty of inherent existence. Which brings us to the second point, the mode of ‘seeing’. This mode is
       what is known as a valid cognition of a nonconceptual mind. ‘Valid cognition’ and ‘nonconceptual mind’ are
       epistemological terms. We will examine valid cognition, in a later installment. Suffice to say however, a valid cognizer
       is a mind which realizes its object non-deceptively. So now then we come to the skandhas. Skandha is a Sanskrit
       word which means ‘heap’, or ‘pile’. It is also translated as ‘aggregate’ There are five skandas: form (ignorance),
       feeling (sensation), perception(recognition), formation (concept), and consciousness. These aggregates are the
       aspects of experience that make up the individual and his world; that is upon these heaps we impute our notion of
       ‘self’ and ‘other’, from moment to moment.

       4.2 Topics of Discussion
       So the stage is set. In this installment there are a few ideas that need to be explored here. The first is why
       Avalokiteshvara was meditating on the emptiness of the skandhas, or why this line appears in the sutra. This is an
       important moment in the development of the “higher schools” of the Mahayana. The second idea is the meaning of the
       skandhas in terms of their function. The third idea is the relevance of this model of self to our own experience of self. I
       will weave discussion of the third point into my comments on the second point. A fourth point concerns the
       compatibility of this view with current, scientific views of self, but in particular, of the mind/body dilemma.

       4.3 The Historical Significance of the line
       To understand what it means to say that Avalokiteshvara ‘saw the skandas to be empty of nature’ one should have
       some familiarity with the view of an obsolete Hinayana school, known as the Sharvakas iii. The Shravakas were one
       of seventeen Hinayana schools which flourished in the first several centuries following the Buddha’s awakening. This
       view held that “self” is imputed on the skandhas, as the Buddha taught, and that by analysis and meditative equipoise
       one could realize the selflessness of the skandhas. In this case conventional reality is defined as that which can be
       reduced or ‘destroyed’. Thus, for example, a table exists conventionally, because it can be explained in terms of its
       parts; it has a top, legs and so on. And each of those pieces has sides, tops bottoms and so on. Anyone of them can
       be broken or cut in half and reduced to smaller pieces. But at some point, reduction is no longer possible and one
       arrives at an irreducible, or partless particle, or quanta, if you like. Likewise, Time, or moments of experience can be
       divided into smaller and smaller conceivable units – the smallest, however, is described as the duration of a finger snap
       divided sixty four times. Ultimate Truth then, is that which cannot be reduced or deconstructed or destroyed. So, an
       analogy might be that conventional truth for the Shravaka is like the contents of a movie in which things appear to exist
       continuously. Ultimate truth understands that each moment exists separately, and in dependence on its previous
       moment, and those moments are divisible into smaller and smaller, ultimately irreducible moments. Hence it recognizes
       that there are frames in the movie, and does not mistake the movies stream of contents for a continually existing thing.
       Still, it accepts the individual frames as possessing inherent existence.

       4.4
       The problem here for the Mahayana practitioner is that the Shravaka stops short: first in terms of not seeing the
       emptiness of self and other, as opposed to the mere selflessness of the skandhas, and in terms of maintaining the view
       that irreducible particles, or irreducible consciousness possessed inherent existence. So, therefore, the Buddha and
       Avalokiteshvara, with their superior realization, were meditating on the emptiness of the skandhas. And that is the
       significance of the words in the sutra. To be sure, the above explanation of the Shravaka view is drastically simplified
       (for a moderately more detailed, but exponentially more authentic explanation, go here). Hopefully, by examining the
       skandhas themselves, we can arrive at a better understanding of the ‘self’ that is imputed, which exists conventionally
       and which is empty of inherent existence.

       4.5 The Skandhas
       Before beginning, a caveat is in order: This discussion of the skandhas is by no means exhaustive. This is a very
       complex topic and I am not well enough educated to go into it in much greater detail than I am now. In reality, a
       thorough explanation of the skandhas would be, literally, voluminous. The ‘experts’ on this topic, for example, are
       typically scholars who’ve earned the titles of Geshe or Khenpo, and they only receive those degrees after successfully
       completing a twelve to fifteen year curriculum – a curriculum I have barely even begun. Finally, we will be returning to
       this topic again in another installment, so perhaps what is not clear here will become more clear then. Or maybe not.
       That having been said, we can cautiously push on.

       4.6
       The Tibetan Buddhist view, mind is defined as that which by nature is clear, and which function is knowing. Minds,
       however, are moments of mental events, or thoughts. There are two types of mind, conceptual minds, and
       nonconceptual minds. The thing we call ‘self’ is just a conceptual mind which has made the mistake of reifying itself;
       it is an adventitious mind. On what basis, you might ask, has this conceptual mind declared itself existent? The short
       answer is that this self is projected on the basis of experience of self and other. The universe of relative experience can
       be broken down into two sorts; forms and mental events. These two groups can be further desegregated into two
       types of form and four types of mental experiences or activities. These five are the five skandhas. (Ultimately,
       however, all them are subsumed by mind, conceptual or non-conceptual; existing relatively, or beyond existence or
       nonexistence, in the ultimate sense.) The skandhas, then, are, the total experience of the psycho-physical thing we call
       ‘self’. In discussing them, we are exploring the experiential constituents of consciousness that we call “I”, or “self” or
       “ego”. Essentially, what the skandhas suggest is that our experience of a ‘self’ that is separate from all other
       phenomena, and our experience of all phenomena as ‘other’, is the result of a ‘mistake’ on the part of consciousness.
       The skandhas explain how this process takes place, continuously, instantaneously, from moment to moment.

       4.7
       This is a somewhat radical idea; what we experience as self is actually a mistaken mind which possesses no inherent
       existence. Yet there must be a process by which this mistake takes place, including a cause and an agent for that
       cause. The result, of course, is the mind which takes ‘self’ as its object. The process is the skandhas and the twelve
       links of dependent origination. The mind that is mistaken is not different from the mind that is, fundamentally, open,
       clear and sensitive: the awakened mind. Trungpa Rinpoche explains this basic mind thusly:
            Fundamentally there is just open space, the basic ground, what we really are. Our most fundamental state of
            mind, before the creation of ego, is such that there is basic openness, basic freedom a spacious quality; and we
            have now, and have always had this openness. Take, for example, our everyday lives and thought patterns.
            When we see an object in the instant there is a sudden perception which has no logic or conceptualization to it
            at all; we just perceive the thing in the open ground. Then immediately we panic and begin to rush about trying
            to add something to it, either trying to find a name for it or trying to find pigeon holes in which we could locate
            or categorize it. Gradually things develop from there.
            This development does not take the shape of a solid entity, rather the development is illusory, the mistaken
            belief in a “self” or “ego”. Confused mind is inclined to view itself as a solid, on-going thing, but it is only a
            collection of tendencies, events. In Buddhist terminology, this collection is referred to as the Five Skandhas, or
            Five Heaps. iv

So, this ‘basic ground’ or ‘space’ is the nonconceptual mind discussed in the previous installment. It is open,
unimpeded, sensitive. It is without the reference points of subject and object.

       4.8 The Skandha of Form
       Form is divided into two types, causal and resultant. Within each type there are numerous subcategories. Below is a
       brief outline of these categories.

       I Form
       A Four Types of Causal Form
       1 Earth
       2 Water
       3 Fire
       4 Wind
       B Eleven Types of Resultant Form
       1 The Five Sense Faculties
       2 The Five Sense Objects
       3 Imperceptible Objects

       To begin with, form refers to the body and the environment. It “is a very general term referring to all the many things
       perceivable by the eye and the other sense organs, whether they be near or far, clear or indistinct, pleasant or
       unpleasant, in the past, present or future” v. Form can also be divided into two groups; those which can be contacted
       or touched, and those which may be examined mentally. The unifying characteristic is that forms are objects of
       knowledge. That is they are perceivable and can be objects of conceptualization.

       4.9
       The first group of form types are causal forms. They are causal in the sense that their qualities are necessary
       conditions for the coming together of other forms. So, what we have then is the structure of support or solidity, which
       is expressed as Earth. Earth is the basis for activity. We have the capabilities of fluidity and cohesion, which are
       expressed by the element of Water. There is the energy of heat and ripening, which is represented by Fire. Finally,
       there are the forces of expansion, dispersal and motion expressed as Wind. Thus we have forms which are, directly or
       indirectly perquisites for other forms, or are the effects of the coming together of other causal or resultant forms.

       4.10
       There are eleven types of resultant forms. The first five are the sense faculties. The next five are the objects of those
       faculties. the eleventh type is imperceptible forms. The five sense faculties are the ‘eye faculty’ the ‘ear faculty’ the
       ‘nose faculty’, the ‘tongue faculty’ and the ‘body faculty’. These faculties are capable of apprehending sense objects.
       The sense objects are the second group of resultant forms. Thus For the ‘eye faculty’ there is an ‘object of the eye
       faculty’. It is quite, simply, what the eye faculty sees. Each sense faculty has an object, therefore. Each of the objects
       can be further divided. For example, objects of the eye faculty can be classified by color and by shape; sounds can be
       classified as those made by sentient beings, those made by means of non-sentient agents and those which are
       venerable. Likewise, sounds can be classified as those which express meaning and those which do not. The eleventh
       type of form are imperceptible forms which are perceivable by meditating minds or by non-meditating conceptual
       minds. Examples include imagined forms such as unicorns; atomic forms or those arrived at inferentially; unapparent
       forms, such as vows or promises; and forms perceived in meditation.

       4.11
       What occurs at the level of the first skandha is the creation of dualistic experience. Trungpa Rinpoche explains it this
       way:
            [T]his skandha, the skandha of Ignorance-Form, has three different aspects or stages which we could examine
            through another metaphor. Suppose in the beginning there is an open plain without any mountain or trees,
            completely open land, a simple desert without any particular characteristics. That is how we are, what we are.
            We are very simple and basic. And yet there is a sun shining, a moon shining, and there will be lights and
            colors, the texture of the desert. There will be some feeling of the energy which plays between heaven and
            earth. This goes on and on.
            Then, strangely, there is suddenly someone to notice all this. It is as if one of the grains of sand had stuck its
            neck out and begun to look around. We are that grain of sand, coming to the conclusion of our separateness.
            This is the “Birth of Ignorance” in its first stage, a kind of chemical reaction.
            The second stage of Ignorance-Form is called “The Ignorance Born Within”. Having noticed that one is
            separate, then there is the feeling that one has always been so. It is an awkwardness, the instinct toward self
            consciousness. It’s also one’s excuse for remaining separate, an individual grain of sand. It’s an aggressive type
            of ignorance, though not exactly aggressive in the sense of anger; it has not developed as far as that. Rather it is
            aggression in the sense that one feels awkward, unbalanced, and so one tries to secure one’s ground, create a
            shelter for oneself. It is the attitude that one is a confused and separate individual, and that is all there is to it.
            One has identified oneself as separate from the basic landscape of space and openness.
            The third type of ignorance is “Self-Observing Ignorance” watching oneself. There is a sense of seeing oneself
            as an external object, which leads to the first notion of “other.” One is beginning to have a relationship with a
            so-called “external” world. This is why these three stages of ignorance constitute the skandha of
            Form-Ignorance; one is beginning to create a world of forms.
            When we speak of “ignorance” we do not mean stupidity at all. In a sense ignorance is very intelligent, but it is
            a completely two-way intelligence. That is to say, one purely reacts to one’s projections rather than just seeing
            what is. There is no situation of “letting be” at all, because one is ignoring what one is all the time. That is the
            basic definition of ignorance. vi

       Perhaps it should be pointed out, that this process is occurring in a fraction of a second. It is what happens as we
       engage our perceptions from moment to moment. In summary then, the skandha of form explains the evolution of the
       mistaken idea of the dualistic existence of “self” and external phenomena. And, again, a phenomena is defined as an
       object of knowledge because it has been perceived by a mind. The skandha of form, then comprises our experience
       of the universe, including our experience of our bodies. It is the basis for “I” and “other”. This skandha arises from
       moment to moment.

4.12 The Skandha of Feeling
Feeling, also translated as ‘sensation’ is divided into bodily feelings and mental feelings.

       II Feeling/Sensation
       A Bodily Sensations
       1 Pleasurable
       2 Painful
       3 Neutral
       B Mental Sensations
       1 Pleasurable
       2 Painful
       3 Neutral

       Essentially, there are three feelings or sensations that we experience to varying degrees, as a result of the interaction of
       causal and resultant forms with consciousness. There are those that are pleasurable (positive), those that are
       uncomfortable (negative) and those which are neutral. Our experience of them occurs in relation to our bodies and in
       relation to our minds. Many of these feelings are obvious and others are very subtle or even imperceptible in relation
       to their cause. For example, if one is engrossed in reading and someone comes in and takes a pen from the table, the
       reader may see it – but not register it. Then later, when he is finished, the reader may realize the pen is missing and feel
       upset.

       4.13
       Trungpa Rinpoche, again:
            The next development is the setting up of a defense mechanism to protect our ignorance. This defense
            mechanism is Feeling, the second skandha. Since we have already ignored open space, we would like next to
            feel the qualities of solid space, in order to bring complete fulfillment to the grasping quality we are developing.
            Of course space does not mean just bare space, for it contains color and energy, beautiful and picturesque. But
            we have ignored them altogether. Instead there’s just a solidified version of that color; and the color becomes
            captured color, and the energy becomes captured energy, because we have solidified the whole space and
            turned it into an “other”. So we begin to reach out and feel the qualities of “other”. By doing so we reassure
            ourselves that we exist. “If I can feel that out there, then I must be here.”
            Whenever anything happens, one reaches out to feel whether the situation is seductive or threatening or neutral.
            Whenever there is a sudden separation, a feeling of not knowing the relationship of “that” to “this”, we tend to
            feel for our ground. This is the extremely efficient feeling mechanism that we begin to set up, the Second
            Skandha.

       4.14The Skandha of Perception
       This skandha is also translated as ‘recognition. This event is ‘grasping at characteristics or at appearances” as though
       they were real and permanent. There are two aspects, and three scopes to this skandha:

       III Perception/Recognition
       A Two Aspects
       1 Identification
       2 Differentiation
       B Three Scopes
       1 Small
       2 Extensive
       3 Immeasurable

       The two aspects are identification, and differentiation. This is the process by which we establish, as a result of grasping
       at the attributes of an object, that the it is ‘yellow’. The second aspect is differentiation. Here characteristics are
       grasped at in conceptual terms. This involves differentiating the object from other objects, as in ‘this is a banana’. One
       can also apprehend an object by its symbol, or without knowing its name, but by its characteristics vii. The three
       degrees or intensity of scope are, small, extensive and immeasurable. Here scope refers to the scope of one’s
       perceptual abilities. Ordinary people lack the immeasurable perception of a buddha, or even the extensive ability of
       bodhisattvas. Perception is a very direct, straightforward experience. The grasping at the object of perception does
       not take place immediately viii, however. To recapitulate then, form encompasses all phenomena that are objects of
       knowledge. Feeling, the second aggregate, is the impression resulting from perception of those objects. Perception
       itself is the process of distinguishing characteristics and differentiating objects. At this level there is not yet conceptual
       thinking, but there is a sense that the object and its characteristics are real and permanent.

       4.15 The Skandha of Formation
       Formation, or ‘concept’ (sometimes ‘compositional factors’) refers, in a general way to thinking. More particularly, it
       refers to the type of activity that takes place in a mind. There are fifty-one divisions, called samskaras, each with
       additional subdivisions:

       IV Formation
       These 51 States may be: virtuous, nonvirtuous, neither or variable
       A The Five Pervasive Mental States
       B The Five Determinative States
       C The Eleven Virtuous Mental Occurrences
       D The Twenty-six Unvirtuous Mental Occurrences
       1 The Six Root Defilements
       2 The Twenty Subsidiary Emotional Afflictions
       E The Four Variable Occurrences

       As is indicated above, they divide into five groups and are either virtuous ix, nonvirtuous, neither virtuous nor
       nonvirtuous, or are variable. We will not discuss all fifty one states, but we will discuss the types of states and a few of
       the most outstanding mental states.

       4.16
       The first five are pervasive and are present no matter what we’re involved in. They are intention, concentration,
       contact, feeling, and perception,. Intention is “movement toward an object [mental or physical – Tim A] such as
       when one thinks ‘I will go, I will sleep I will look, I will smell, I will conceive of an idea’. What ever sense faculties are
       involved, intention runs through one or more of these six senses” x. The key idea here is that there is movement toward
       the object, to address it. This seems to operate overtly, as well as subtly as in the case of impulses, such taking a sip
       of coffee. The second is concentration, which is the ability of mind to hold its object. The third is contact, which is
       mind’s ability to maintain concentration. The fourth and fifth are the same feeling and perception that comprise the
       second and third skandhas. The determinative states of mind are: resolution, interest, recollection, samadhi and
       wisdom. They are somewhat similar to the five pervading states, but they are not omnipresent, and their intensity
       varies from instance to instance. The next thirty-seven are virtuous or nonvirtuous states and include, for example,
       faith, carefulness, hatred, pride etc. The four variable states are: sleep, remorse, investigation and examination..

       4.17
       Trungpa Rinpoche explains the experiential quality of the fourth skandha as follows:
            The next development is the Fourth Skandha, Concept. Perception-Impulse is an automatic reaction to intuitive
            feeling. However, this kind of automatic reaction is not really enough of a defense to protect one’s ignorance
            and guarantee one’s security. In order to really protect and deceive oneself completely, properly, one needs
            intellect, the ability to name and categorize things. Thus we label things and events as being “good”, “bad”,
            “beautiful”, “ugly” and so on, according to which impulse we find appropriate to them.
            So the structure of ego is gradually becoming heavier and heavier, stronger. Up to this point, ego's development
            has been purely an action and reaction process; but from now on ego gradually develops beyond an ape
            instinct and becomes more sophisticated. We begin to experience intellectual speculation, confirming or
            interpreting ourselves, putting ourselves into certain logical, interpretive situations. The basic nature of intellect is
            quite logical. Obviously there will be the tendency to work for a positive condition: to confirm our experience,
            to interpret weakness into strength, to fabricate a logic of security, to confirm our ignorance. xi

4.18 The Skandha of Consciousness
The fifth skandha is called consciousness. There are, in the Mahayana traditions, xii eight consciousness. they are:

       V Consciousness
       A The Eight Types
       1 Eye Consciousness
       2 Ear Consciousness
       3 Nose Consciousness
       4 Tongue Consciousness
       5 Body Consciousness
       6 Mind Consciousness
       7 Afflicted Consciousness
       8 Basic Consciousness

       Here, consciousness, or ‘mind’ is the same one discussed in the previous installment. It’s nature is clarity (albeit
       obscured), and its function is cognition. A consciousness is a thought, or a moment of awareness. It is not an organ
       which has a moment of consciousness or the condition of a person. The first five consciousnesses are associated with
       the five sense faculties, which are included in the first skandha. Mind consciousness is included because it is capable of
       knowing, or recalling past events, memories and so on. Thus the objects of the first five types of consciousness are
       form, and the objects of the sixth consciousness are non-material, mental objects. Another distinction is that while the
       first five consciousnesses are passive and receptive, the mind consciousness is active and reflective. It should be well
       understood also, that the five sense consciousnesses are not ‘conceptual minds’. that is, they do not think thoughts or
       hold concepts. They merely gather and arrange sensory information. Through all six types consciousness, one can
       know distinctly the nature and characteristics of phenomena xiii. It should be noted that although six sense
       consciousnesses have been described, there is only one fundamental consciousness, the all basis-consciousness or
       basic ground (described below). But because consciousness arises and subsides from moment to moment in
       conjunction with a sense faculty, it is experienced as a type of consciousness. Thus, mind is always aware of
       something.

       4.19
       Amongst the various Buddhist tenet systems, the seventh and eighth consciousness are discussed from the Mahayana
       ‘Mind Only School’ upward. They do not occur in the lower tenet systems, although they are extrapolated from the
       view concerning the sixth consciousness, which is held by all tenet systems. The seventh consciousness, also known as
       the ‘disturbed’ or ‘afflicted’ consciousness because it is afflicted with four emotions: View of Self, Pride (thinking
       “I”), Attachment to Self, and Ignorance with regards to its insubstantiality. xiv This consciousness diminishes as one
       enters and progresses along the bodhisattva path (which is partly to say, as one stabilizes and strengthens one’s
       meditation). However, until that time, this consciousness accompanies all cognitive acts. Its basis for imputing its ‘self’
       is the eighth consciousness.

       4.20
       The eighth consciousness is known as the all basis-consciousness, or basic consciousness. It is the basic ground xv
       because it holds the seeds of the skandhas, the ayatanas and the dhatus. Mipham Rinpoche explains it thusly: “It is the
       basis for cognitive acts, and without bias, it is merely cognizant and conscious. Due to the fact of being merely the
       seed for environment, sense objects and a body to appear, it is also called all-ground and perpetuating consciousness.
       Since whatever is experienced as environment, sense objects and body is merely the all ground consciousness
       appearing as that, just like a dream experience, it is also called the all-ground consciousness of maturation.” xvi.

       4.21
       Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche explains the relationship of consciousnesses and the skandhas this way:
            …Another point that needs to be made clear here is the distinction between ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness’. In the
            Buddhist tradition, mind is purely that which perceives [the cognitive aspect – Tim A]. It does not require
            brainwork; it is simple perception, just on the level of the nervous system. This simple instinctive function is
            called ‘mind’. The Sanskrit term is citta, which literally means ‘heart’, but it also means ‘essence’, that basic
            essence of mind which contains the faculty of perception. This kind of perception called mind – reacting to hot
            and cold, favorable and unfavorable and so on – is very direct, simple and subtle at the same time.
            Consciousness, on the other hand, is articulated and intelligent. It is the finally developed state of being that
            contains all of the previous elements [skandhas – Tim A]. It contains all the fundamental subtleties of ‘mind’, the
            instinctive aspects on the level of feeling and it also includes thought patterns. It includes any kind of thinking
            process. But here the thinking process is on a subconscious level, whether it be discursive, pictorial or
            inquisitive. Consciousness is that sort of fundamental creepy quality that runs behind actual living thoughts,
            behind the samskaras. The explicit thoughts, the samskaras, are the actual grown-up thoughts, so to speak;
            whereas the thoughts produced by consciousness are the undergrowth of these thoughts. They act as a kind of
            padding. The whole pattern of psychology works in such a way that it is impossible for the explicit thoughts –
            virtuous thoughts or evil thoughts or neutral ones – to be suspended in nowhere, without any context
            whatsoever. The subconscious thoughts make the context that is necessary for the explicit ones. They constitute
            the sort of padding or background texture which permits the process to function in such a way that the next
            appropriate thoughts in the explicit sequence can come through. they are in a sense kindling.
            So, you see, the whole pattern is now very efficiently set up. Now if even the second skandha of feeling does
            not operate quite completely, or if perception does not function quite properly, consciousness with its
            subconscious gossip can supply the missing elements and keep the whole process in action. It acts as sort of an
            ignition. It starts up on a particular theme and then sends its message back to the other skandhas so as to
            activate the skandhic process, to get the whole mechanism going.
            So consciousness constitutes an immediately available source of occupation for the momentum of the skandhas
            to feed on. And, as we discussed before, meditation provides almost the only occasion for that momentum to
            stop. That is exactly where meditation plays an important role. xvvii

This concludes the discussion of the description of the skandhas and our experience of them.

       4.22 The Relevance of the Buddhist View in the Contemporary World
       Now we are left with the question, how does this model relate, if at all, to the current scientific or philosophical views
       of self? To answer this question, we will examine an aspect of the skandha of Perception, namely, the conditions for
       perception to arise and a thought to arise as the result of perception. To do so, we will utilize a bit of the voluminous
       Buddhist epistemology, known in Tibetan as lorig. Having laid the ground, so to speak, we can ask whether this view
       has any validity or not, when compared or contrasted with the prevailing scientific view of self and perception, of mind
       and body.

       4.23
       Before doing so, perhaps it would be useful to pause and consider what pitfalls lie ahead. So, I will state my
       motivation and my biases up front. I would like to reiterate that my intention in this essay is not to demonstrate that
       what the Buddha and subsequent practitioner/scholars have understood vis-a-vis perception and how the mind
       operates, is the same as what modern science understands. They’re not. Nor is it my intention to highlight similarities.
       Rather, my intention is to point out their differences in the hopes that what is useful in each view – but not understood
       by the other side, can be taken into consideration for the benefit of all beings. I start from the belief that scientific
       theories which are firmly ensconced in the scientific materialist view are fundamentally flawed with regards to
       explaining consciousness, and I shall give my rational for that belief. But, since relieving the suffering of sentient beings
       is the raison d’erte for the dharma, buddhists generally are interested at throwing everything, including the kitchen
       sink, at the problem. Thus I do not hold an anti-scientific view. There is no hesitancy on Buddhist’s part to embrace
       scientific endeavors and discoveries which are similarly motivated – even when they conflict with the Buddhist view.
       Likewise, it is, I believe, an indirect objective of science to make the world a more habitable place; to provide
       remedies for sickness, to develop life saving, life enriching technologies and so on. The two traditions, science and
       Buddhism, then share some common goals. The way in which they pursue these goals, however, is quite different, and
       one might conclude that the one has nothing to offer the other. But, as Christopher deCharms of the Keck Center at
       UCSF points out:
            “Buddhist scholars have an enormous descriptive understanding of consciousness, viewed from the internal
            perspective and addressing complex aspects of mind, complete with a framework for defining what questions
            are important and what classifications are most useful, neuroscience has none of these things. Indeed, it has
            largely avoided issues of consciousness, introspection and complex mental phenomena altogether. Conversely,
            while science libraries in the West are filled with objective extrospective data on the minute details of the
            mechanisms underlying different functions of the brain, as well as its microscopic anatomy, the Buddhists have
            almost completely ignored both the question of the mechanisms of mind, and the understanding that can be
            gained by external observations.” xviii.

       So, what each side brings to this task then, are comprehensive views of material and nonmaterial events, and well
       honed tools, extropspective and introspective, for examining their subjects. That having been said, we unfurl the
       banner of epistemology and march on.

       4.24 An Epistemological View of Perception
       Epistemology is known in Tibetan as Lorig, or The Study of Valid Cognition. Although there are varying views within
       the Mahayana, the predominate views are anchored in the ontology of madyamika, as elucidated by the great scholar
       Nagarjuna. After Nagarjuna, other scholars, including Dignaga and Dharmakirti further interpreted and codified his
       teachings. It is Dharmakirti’s work that generally serves as the basis for the epistemology used by Tibetan buddhists.
       The epistemology I refer to is based on the Sautantrika Following Reasoning, which is the epistemological basis for
       the Prasangika Madyamika view. We will discuss Perception from within that framework, then.

       4.25
       A moment of perception is the result of the coming together of causes and conditions. For perception to occur there
       must be a sense faculty, such as an eye, an object of that faculty, a form such as a sound, for example, and a
       corresponding sense consciousness. These three are called a dhatu. They are also constituents of the first and fifth
       skandhas. The sense faculty is known as the dominate condition. If there is no sense faculty, the objects of that
       faculty cannot be perceived. So, if there is no eye with which to see red, there will be no experience of red. Hence,
       the faculty is the dominate condition for perception to occur. The object that is apprehended by the sense organ is the
       object condition. Without an object, there is no perception of an object. The third condition is called the immediate
       condition; it is the immediately preceding moment of consciousness. The shortest moment is defined as the snap of
       a finger divided 64 times (which I crudely estimate to be 0.00520 seconds.) The immediate condition is the cause of
       the arising of the sense consciousness. That is to say, the sense consciousness does not arise out of nowhere. Rather,
       consciousness manifests as one of the eight types from moment to moment. Consciousness is, then, a stream, a
       continuum. When there is contact between a sense organ, its object and the respective sense consciousness, there is
       perception. When there is contact, there is feeling, such as defines the second skandha. Thus, perception occurs over
       the course of two moments.

       4.26
       The constituents of the first moment are a mind consciousness, a sense consciousness and its object. For example,
       one might be reading a newspaper when all of a sudden a car outside backfires. At that moment, in the first fraction of
       an instant, there is the ear faculty apprehending the sound, and the mind consciousness which, because it is engaged in
       the contents of the newspaper, has not recognized the sound. In the next instant, ear consciousness replaces that mind
       consciousness and is aware of the sound. At this moment, there is direct perception of the noise. Thus, in the first
       moment, there is a dominate condition, the ear, an objective condition, the sound of the car back-firing, and an
       immediate condition, the mind consciousness absorbed in the newspaper. At the moment that the sense consciousness
       arises, there is perception. The consciousness which perceives is known as a direct perceiver. If any of the first three
       conditions were lacking, perception would not occur.

       4.27
       We need to keep in mind, that what we are talking about so far, is the subjective experience, the mental experience
       of a moment of perception. This view does not preclude a relationship with what I shall call brain activity (It does,
       however, take a very different view of causation). From a buddhist point of view, again, all phenomena and all
       noumena can be classified either as forms or as non-material things (i.e. minds), whose ultimate nature is the same, i.e.
       lacking inherent existence. This view conflicts with the scientific materialist view which believes that all phenomena are
       material, and are expressed as matter or as energy, and possess inherent existence. Part of the reason for this conflict
       is that the Buddhist view is introspective, whereas the scientific view is extraspective. (But another reason involves
       causality, and we will address that issue in this installment.) On the buddhist side, introspection is appropriate tool
       because the problem to be solved (i.e. dualistic mind) originates in the mind. On the side of science, the problems to
       be solved, from the time of Descartes, relate to the physical universe. Having dutifully reminded the reader of these
       differences we can continue.

       4.28
       To step back into the first moment, the object condition is the sixth consciousness. Unlike the first five
       consciousnesses which are receptive and passive, and which apprehend their objects through the force of those
       objects, this consciousness which is called yid in Tibetan, is active and reflective. Yid takes as its objects concepts,
       emotions, memories, perceptions and other noumena. Thus yid can also function as a both an immediate condition,
       and a dominate condition. It apprehends its objects through subjective dispositions and secondary mental factors,
       which are the fifty-one samskaras of the fourth skandha. These arise out of the alayavijnana, the eighth
       consciousness. So, mind then can take perception as an object. Thus a sense consciousness can also serve as the
       object condition for a mind consciousness. Perception, again, occurs in a fraction of a second. This then is the third
       moment: The conceptual mind, yid has replaced the sense consciousness as the engaged consciousness, and taken
       perception as its object. It provides a name/concept for the noise: a-car-back-firing. In other words, the perceptual
       consciousness essentially calls out “Hey! I got this sound, here! You might want to come and have a look.” And
       conceptual mind steps in and names it. What this mind experiences, however, is not the noise, but a mental image of
       the noise. That image, also known as a generic image, is the opposite of a non-car-back-firing. Thus, the yid arrives
       at its object through an exclusionary process.

       4.29
       The mental consciousness which arises, is conditioned by previous experience, emotions and so on. Thus, it’s object
       is not the perceptual object of the sense consciousness, but is a conceptualized object instead. Hence, the sixth
       consciousness is a conceptual mind. What this means then, is that all ensuing moments of the sense consciousness will
       be mixed with all sorts of mental information, including concepts, memories, emotions and so on. Why is this?
       Because the object of the sense consciousness is perceptual; that is the sense consciousness is a nonconceptual direct
       perceiver: it is passive. The mind consciousness is without the ability to see, hear, smell, taste, or touch objects. So,
       while the sense consciousness, from moment to moment, feeds pure perceptual information to the sixth consciousness,
       yid is constantly relating to that information on the basis of archived information. In other words, yid is relating to its
       object on the basis of ‘me-ness’ or ‘my-ness’; the perception has meaning on the basis of experiences or information
       that yid regards as its own. Yid, is furthermore unable to separate the mental concepts it has overlaid atop the object
       of perception from the object itself. Thus, it does not directly perceive or experience the sound, and thus it is always
       mistaken with regards to the nature or status of the object. This ignorance is the basis for the arising of “self”, dualistic
       mind.

       4.30
       So what’s going on here is that there’s a series of successive moments of perception which serves as the object
       condition for the arising of a mind consciousness, which in turn becomes the immediate cause for ensuing moments.
       This whole complex then is what’s known as a thought. As the moments progress, the ear faculty and consciousness
       may still be engaged, with the object being the sound of the car itself. Thus there are a series of new moments in which
       the car makes noise, the ear faculty apprehends the sounds of the car, and a preceding mind consciousness
       (conceptualizing the car) are at work. Because these conditions are present, perception continues to arise, continues
       to be taken as the object of yid, and yid in turn continues to become the immediate condition for the next the moment
       of perception. To bring this back to the level of the man-on-the street, then, one moment you’re absorbed in reading
       the newspaper. In the next moment there’s a noise which is heard by the ear. Then there is a consciousness of the
       noise, then conceptual mind steps in and says ‘that’s a car back-firing’. Included in that name, however, is the notion
       of car, all previous experiences with back-firing automobiles, and any emotional information that is relevant – for
       example, maybe, for fun, as a kid the newspaper-reader stuck potatoes in the exhaust pipes of cars near his home. Or
       maybe his friend drove a Volkswagen which back-fired a lot. In any case, immediately following the thought, ear
       consciousness perceives more car sounds and mind consciousness dumps old information on these new sounds. Soon
       the hearer has abandoned the newspaper and is thinking (however briefly) about a-car-which-has-back-fired.

       4.31
       Hopefully, the above discussion has revealed how, based on the skandhas, a conceptual mind arises from
       continuously, moment to moment, and how it projects the notion of a ‘self’ onto the process. Form is contacted in the
       first moment, perceived and determined meritorious (i.e. worth thinking about) in the second moment (the second and
       third skandhas) , conceptualized in the third moment (the fourth skandha) as a result of consciousnesses (the fifth
       skandha) operating throughout each of the moments.

       4.32 The Mind/Body Dilemma in Buddhism and Science: Function and Causation
       What the preceding discussion has been about, in a very certain sense is the relationship between consciousness and
       the body, the good old mind/body dichotomy. I would like, therefore to consider this perennial issue from two
       perspectives: perception and its function, and perception and causality. I would like to consider these perspectives in
       the context of the buddhist view, and the scientific materialist view.

       4.33
       The buddhist view holds that sentient beings suffer as a result of misunderstanding the true, nature of phenomena,
       including mind. Where there is self, there is other. Where there is other, craving and aversion arise. From these all
       suffering flows. We want what we see and are discontent (to some degree) until we acquire it. Having acquired it, we
       want to keep it and are (to some degree) concerned about loosing it. Or, we see something and we worry it will
       happen to us or harm us. Or, if we have something we don’t like, we are worried (to some degree) that we will not be
       rid of it. For the adventitious mind which imputes itself on the skandhas, perception is the process by which it
       constantly affirms its existence – and by which its existence is threatened. We relate to all moments in terms of “I” and
       other, or, here, where I am, versus, there, where that is, and so on. We have a sense of separateness – I am not that;
       of individuality – I am not the same as that; of permanence – I have always been me. Conventional mind is never not
       caught up in its sense of self-existence or self importance. This preoccupation pervades all mental states and activities,
       from mundane activities such as dressing, to reflex actions such as brushing a fly away. Everything we consciously do
       is motivated by the intention to feel comfort/happiness/pleasure, or to avoid discomfort/misery/pain. So perception
       then, is one of the chief tools by which this self propagates its existence. It’s the syringe that delivers the dose of
       self-confirming data to a junkie addicted to its own mistaken existence.

       4.34
       I believe that the western approach to the question of perception is oriented around the issue of evolution, and in
       particular, behavior which promotes survival. This view begins at the beginning, starting from the emergence of
       bacteria from non-living molecules, and proceeding from there, all the way to humans. Implicit in this view is that
       perception and other mental activities are emergent properties of matter. Behavior is inferred on the basis of
       movement and actions. Thus, when a single celled organism, such as an amoeba does something, like eats, for
       example, it is assumed that such behavior is the result of ‘sensors’ which perceive food, for example, and ‘motors’
       which enable the organism to move or catch its prey. Similarly, those sensors and motors enable the amoeba to sense
       obstacles and to move away from them. When neurons are added to the mix, then the potential for even more
       complex behavior arises. In particular, the organism which possesses neurons is able to communicate information from
       one part of its body to other, remote parts so that they can act in concert.

       4.35
       But, I do not think that perception here, is necessarily associated with consciousness. We have not yet confronted the
       mind/body dichotomy. Indeed, perception seems to be reduced to neurons firing as a result of being stimulated.
       Francisco Varela recounts the following: “One of the classical experiments for understanding sensory phenomena such
       as vision… was done many years ago with the retina of a frog. Imagine that an electrode is now sitting inside a frog’s
       brain, and we present the frog with various kinds of visual stimuli. A stimulus, according to neuroscientists, is anything
       that makes a neuron react. If I am recording from a neuron and I present something, say a bar that moves, and the
       neuron doesn’t do anything, we could say the stimulus isn’t appropriate or adequate. It will not make the neuron fire.
       What these researchers found was that, for example, a small dot, a large dot, an edge that moves are adequate stimuli.
       that found that particular neurons would not respond to everything but only to one simple item: small dark things that
       move. the scientists concluded: this neuron is a ‘fly detector’.” xix. This is a simple example, to be sure, but it seems to
       frame the general approach, as far as I understand it, to studying the brain, and hence consciousness; there is an
       assumption that for each action, or ‘qualia’ there is a neural correlate which can be discovered as a result of
       stimulation. The hope is that by and by consciousness can be ‘mapped’. So, to carry the logic stated above just a step
       further, we get, life evolved from inert molecules, precede through bacteria to human beings and mind then, is an
       emergent property of matter, which is expressed as a complex arrangement of stimulated neurons. [forgive me if this is
       too crude].The assumption underlying this seems to be that the entire process of perception is a physical one, one of
       physical events influencing or causing other physical events.

       4.36
       Clearly then, Buddhism and science are going about the issue of the function of perception in two completely different
       ways. The Buddhist have begun with the metaphysical question of what causes beings to suffer, and arrived at an
       empirically verifiable answer to the question. But the suffering, and the evidence are subjective experiences.
       Buddhists have little to say about the physical events involved in perception, and the small amount they do say, for
       example concerning the anatomy of the sense faculties, is, basically, incorrect. (which is not the same as saying the
       sequence of events they perceive as taking place don’t actually take place) The scientific view is evolutionary,
       mechanistic, and reductionist, focusing on neural activity and objective measurements. But, because the means of
       acquiring knowledge are reductionist, science is unable to reach upward and actually realize the conscious behavior
       that is imputed by movement and perception. Ironically, one can’t explain the other, and vice versa.

       4.37
       The second question concerning the mind/body dichotomy as pertains to perception is the issue of causation. It might
       be useful to look at other philosophical views pertaining to this question before presenting the buddhist view. To begin
       with, there are at least three philosophical positions one could take on the question of mind/body interaction. The first
       is the Cartesian view which takes the position that mind and body exist separately, and independently. For Descartes,
       mind, and hence knowledge of, for example, mathematical laws, was, literally, God given. Mind, from the Cartesian
       perspective exists as a separate, independent, identifiable thing, from its own side. Descartes thought that the causal
       mechanism that enabled these two entities to influence each other lay in the pineal gland. But, as science has shown,
       the gland has a different function, and Descartes et al. never showed the means by which the two types of substance
       can interact. The second metaphysical view, is that of the Idealists. They assert the mind’s inherent existence, but
       declare that all other phenomena are just the epiphenomena of mind xx. But, they too have never produced an
       explanation of how matter influences the mind. The third view, is the Scientific Realist view which holds that the body
       (and matter) possesses real, independent existence, but that the mind is, instead, a property of matter. But, here too,
       no satisfactory explanation of how matter influences mind has been given. The presumption, however, is that mind, or
       consciousness, is a function of the brain, or an emergent property. Thus it is the byproduct of neural activity and
       possesses no substantial existence of its own. Furthermore, this view holds that it is only the body which influences the
       mind. The reason I present these three views is because, at the heart of each philosophy is an existential question
       about the nature of mind and matter. In each of the three, above, existence is assumed to inhere either in mind or in
       matter, or in both. The Buddhist view, as we shall see, is quite different, arguing that existence does not inhere in mind
       or in matter. This becomes important when considering the solution to the issue of the brain/mind dilemma.

       4.38
       Central to the buddhist tenet system, and its view of causality is the law of dependent and related origination.
       Dependent origination is the other side of the coin called emptiness. As such it is a relative view. This view states that
       all phenomena arise as the result of causes and conditions, and when those conditions no longer maintain, the
       phenomenon changes/ceases to exist/occur. Thus all phenomena are conditioned, and all conditioned phenomena are
       impermanent. Mipham Rinpoche explains dependent origination thusly:
            “What is meant by dependent origination? It means that nothing included under inner or outer phenomena has
            arisen without a cause. They have also not originated from an independent cause, an uncaused and permanent
            creator such as Self, Time, or the Almighty. The fact that phenomena are produced based on the
            interdependence [emphasis mine] of their respective causes and conditions coming together is called
            dependent origination. To proclaim this is the unique approach of the Buddha’s teaching.” xxi

       This is a very important point, especially in regard to the ontological question implicit in the three views stated above,
       and the SM view in particular. Dependent and related origination means that things exist in dependence on their
       causes and conditions, and relation to other things. They do not exist independently, from their own side. Thus, to reify
       them is to commit a grave error. Logically speaking, if anything possessed independent existence, it could not exist in
       relation to anything else, and thus could not interact with anything else, including being the cause or the result of
       something else. From the buddhist point of view, the reification of matter becomes an obstacle to solving the
       mind/matter problem. One could argue, however, that the materialists don’t actually believe that a phenomena exists
       from its own side. But, if science were to take an ontological position on the existence of matter as pertains the brain,
       that view would have to pervade all fields of science. So, the solution seems to be to acknowledge the existential
       question – but then turn around and behave as though matter did possess independent existence. We shall see how
       this apparent contradiction manifests in the mind/matter question.

       4.39
       To return to the question of causality then, the buddhist definition of a cause can be summarized as: If a set of one or
       more events A precedes an event B, and B does not occur without the prior occurrence of A, then A is said to be the
       cause of B. Here I must stress that in the dharmic sense, ‘cause’ takes a different nuance. Rather than the strict usage,
       such as we may be familiar with, such as the convectional heat of a stove causing the cake to bake, here cause has
       more the meaning of a prerequisite for a phenomena to occur or arise. So for example, a prerequisite for sight is an
       eyeball, and a prerequisite for that is matter, and so on. Thus, sight is the result of an eyeball and so on. This model by
       now means excludes the existence of, nor denies the role of receptor cells, rods and nerve endings, neurons and
       synapses and so on. Wallace points out that this “concept of causality can be put to the test in individual cases only
       retrospectively; but this is the way we normally conclude one event caused another. With this less metaphysically
       burdened concept of causality, it becomes perfectly obvious that mental phenomena do act as causes of subsequent
       mental and physical events. It is equally obvious that physical phenomena act as causes of subsequent mental and
       physical events. These facts must be acknowledged regardless of whether one has found a mechanism by which
       causality is made possible. xxii

       4.40
       Although this view may seem overly simplistic, it is amenable to the same precision that is evident is the substantive
       causality sought by scientists. But it leads to very different results when applied to the question of mind/body
       interaction. To elaborate, there are two types of causes within the buddhist definition. The first are substantial causes
       , in which A becomes B (e.g. the sprout becomes the shoot), and the second type are cooperative causes in which A
       contributes to the occurrence of B. To turn this model to the SM view of the mind/body dichotomy, i.e. that mind is
       an emergent property of the brain, then we can easily see the obstacle to a greater understanding of the nature of
       mind, and its relationship to the brain, is an insistence on denying the role of mind in the transaction. This is not a
       scientific dogma, it is the dogma of scientific materialism. Wallace again:
            Now if mental states are in fact nothing other than brain states, then there is no problem in asserting that prior
            neurophysiological events transform into mental states, and thereby act as their substantial causes. But to
            conclude with certainty that mental events are identicle to their neural correlates – or that those mental events
            are simply a function of or state of the corresponding brain states – it would have to be demonstrated
            empirically that the two occur simultaneously and not sequentially. This would entail knowing the precise
            moment when a mental event takes place and the precise moment its neural correlate takes place, and
            ascertaining whether those two moments are simultaneous or sequential. To the best of my knowledge, this
            hasn’t yet been done, and it’s not clear to me how it could be done with sufficient precision. If mental events
            are produced from prior neural events, the two cannot be identical, in which case, it’s valid to ask: Do physical
            processes act as substantial causes or cooperative causes for mental processes?
            If physical events, in causing nonphysical mental events, were to transform into them, the mass/energy of those
            physical events would have to disappear in the process; this is a position rejected by Buddhism and science
            alike, albeit for different reasons. Buddhism therefore proposes that physical processes may act as cooperative,
            but not substantial, causes for mental events. But this raises the question: If preceding physical processes act
            only as cooperative causes for mental events, what, if anything, are the substantial causes of mental events? If
            mental processes had no substantial causes, this would mean they arise from nothing; Buddhism rejects the
            notion that physical events arise from noting. The conclusion drawn by Buddhism is that prior mental events act
            as the substantial causes of subsequent mental events…”

       And, as we’ve seen from the above discussion of perception, prior consciousness is the immediate object of a
       perceiving consciousness, and is thus a prerequisite for consciousness. In this sense consciousness arises in
       dependence on prior-consciousness. It’s substantial cause, therefore, is its prior consciousness.

       4.41
       To return to the scientific view, then, as mentioned, in some scientific circles, mind is regarded as an emergent
       property of matter, which arises as a result of the complexity of the organization of matter. Here I summarize Wallace,
       again. The basis for such an assumption may be that emergent properties of phenomena are easily discernable in
       nature; photosynthesis, for example, is an emergent property of plants, liquidity is an emergent property of water when
       the molecules are in motion and so on. Thus it is consistent with empirical evidence gleaned from other observations
       that consciousness is a function of the brain. But there is an important difference, in observing water, or a plant: one
       can simultaneously observe the subject, and its emergent property, i.e. H2O and wetness, plants and photosynthesis.
       One can’t see the emergent quality without also seeing the thing from which it emerges. This is quite different,
       however, from what happens when we look at the mind/matter problem. When we look at the brain, we do not see its
       emergent property, consciousness. And when we look at consciousness we do not see the matter of which it is
       supposed to be a function. Wallace again:
            “A genuine emergent property of the cells of the brain is the brain’s semi-solid consistency, and that is
            something that objective, physical science can well comprehend. Likewise, scientists clearly understand the
            mechanisms by which photosynthesis occurs in plants, mitosis occurs in cells, and digestion takes place in the
            digestive tract; but they do not understand how the brain produces any state of consciousness. In other words,
            if mental phenomena are in fact nothing more than emergent properties and functions of the brain,
            their relation to the brain is fundamentally unlike every other emergent property found in nature. While
            it is conceivable to learn a great deal about experienced mental states without knowing anything about the brain,
            and it is feasible to learn a good deal about the brain without knowing anything about subjective mental states, it
            is not at all clear how one could learn about H2O at different temperatures and yet know nothing of liquidity or
            solidity, learn about photosynthesis without knowing anything about plants, and so on in the cases of mitosis,
            digestion, and reproduction. While liquidity is perceived as a quality of water, mental phenomena are only
            imagined as properties of the brain. Indeed, if one were to study the brain alone, while totally ignoring human
            behavior and subjective conscious states, one would never learn about consciousness or any other mental
            phenomena. xxii

       4.42
       To go back to the philosophical views at the top of this section, the SM view solves the problem of mind/matter by
       declaring mind to be the same stuff as matter/energy. But it can’t explain how the latter gives rise to the former. The
       problem faced by scientists, I believe, is neatly exposed by the buddhist view of causality. From a buddhist
       perspective, the brain can only be a cooperative cause of mind. I present the above critique of the SM view not out of
       the any belief that because science has not sufficiently explained the mind/body problem, that therefore the buddhist
       view is correct -- but in the hopes that I can highlight the value, the necessity of a subjective model of consciousness.
       Happily, this view, of the importance of the subjective experience of mind in understanding consciousness, and hence
       the mind/body problem seems to be not completely lost on neuroscientists; Christopher deCharms sums up the
       differences in the systems this way:
            A chief difference between these scientific descriptions and those in Tibetan texts is that at each level
            neuroscience attempts to be thoroughly mechanistic and reductionist In its viewpoint. It seeks to explain each
            complex part as resulting from a series of material forces acting on smaller constituent parts. Each of the visual
            maps have been physically observed inside the brain by recording activity of nerve cells. For example, the
            world inside the eye is explained as the electrical activity of an array of individual receptor cells. This electrical
            activity is in turn reduced to mechanisms at the next simpler level: it is explained as the flow of electrical current
            into the cells when they are struck by light. The operations of those currents are further explained in terms of a
            whole cascade of chemicals which are triggered by light and ultimately lead single molecule channels in the cells
            to open and close and allow current to pass. This current is further dissected into the flow of individual types of
            atoms through these micro-channels. if one desires, one can continue this progression down through the physics
            of atoms and even further xxii

       . However, in the next paragraph, deCharms continues in describing the mechanistic analysis that is applied to
       causation: “Its weakness is that at present it has not been able to reach far enough upwards to grasp conscious
       awareness”. In his concluding remarks he writes:
            It is becoming more and more clear that if a scientific understanding of consciousness, even in its simplest
            aspects, is ever to arise, then new methods of observing internal mental phenomena are going to have to be
            developed, because these phenomena are such a fundamental part of consciousness itself. An understanding of
            the mind which does not include subjective experience will always be incomplete. For this reason,
            circumstances now demand a reconciliation of subjective experience and empirical measurement, one which
            has not yet been found. xxiv

       So, the relevance of introspective views of mind, or of perception – such as the buddhist view -- in today’s world,
       would appear to be that it offers an extraordinary catalog of the myriad mental states that we experiences, and the
       means by which we experience them. Moreover, it has precise definitions and a rich vocabulary for explaining these
       things, as well as an internally consistent logic. Finally, it has developed the introspective tools which the task of
       studying mind requires.

       4.43 Conclusion
       In conclusion, the buddhist view of self is that it is an adventitious mind which has imputed its existence on the basis of
       its experience of physical and non-physical objects (i.e. form and mind), which are called the skandhas. Self, and all
       other phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions, but possess no inherent existence from their own
       sides. Mind and body are not understood to be inseparable, but are understood to be cooperative causes for each
       other, but not substantial causes. As such they can influence each other. That they can influence each other is, in our
       experience, self-evident. Yet the scientific materialist view, hewing to the principles of universalism and closure, deny
       this is possible, stating instead that mind has no inherent material existence, being itself an emergent property of matter,
       and as such cannot influence the brain, and thus the body. I believe that view denies subjective reality, is
       metaphysically weak and contradicts objective, empirical knowledge about other aspects of the known universe as
       concerns the qualities of emergent properties. Finally, I believe that it is impossible to try to understand consciousness
       through the process of objectification and reductionism, and that only by acknowledging the validity of empirical
       knowledge gained thorough introspection can one come to fully understand consciousness and, ultimately, reality.